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Article 2

The Foreign Arnici Dilemma
Stephen A. lass*
Lately, a great deal of academic commentary has been
devoted to the Supreme Court's international interpretive
work.' Writings consistently highlight the Court's failure to
use accepted rules, principles, or canons of construction when
interpreting treaties or statutes affecting foreign governments
and nationals. The Court's work product, which generally
reflects a routine adoption of the executive's interpretation,
variously has been termed " b a n k r ~ p t "and
~ "monstr~us."~
This criticism of the Court's foreign interpretive efforts is a
bit surprising in view. of the ongoing absence of intelligible
principles in much of the Court's domestic statutory
construction work. Local Court watchers and critics recognize,
however, that fidelity to neutral principles is not an
interpretive cornerstone for the CourL4 Consequently,

* Stephen A. Plass, Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law.
1. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons And Treaty Interpretation, 41
UCLA L. REV. 953 (1994); Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections On Refoulement And
Haitian Centers Council, 35 HAW. INT'L L.J. 1 (1994) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS];
Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Policy,
103 YALE L.J. 2391 (1994) [hereinafter HAITI PARADIGM];
Jordan J. Paust, After
Alvarez-Machain, Abduction, Standing, Denials of Justice, and Unaddressed Human
L. REV. 551 (1993); Herman de J. Ruiz-Bravo,
Rights Claims, 67 ST. JOHNS
Monstrous Decision: Kidnapping is Legal, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833 (1993);
Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values i n the Age of International Legisprudence, 44
HASTINGSL.J. 185 (1993).
2. Bederman, supra note 1, at 954.
3. Jonathan Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After AlvarezMachain, 45 STAN.L. REV. 939, 943 (1993). Justice Stevens previously made this
observation in Alvarez-Machain. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
655, 687 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I suspect most courts throughout the
civilized world-will be deeply disturbed by the 'monstrous' decision the Court
announces today.").
4. As examples, see Hans W. Boade, "Original Intent" in Historical
Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001 (1991); Kevin R. Johnson,
Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch
Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413 (1993); Vincent Di Lorenzo, A
Fixed Principle Approach to Statutory Construction: The Glass-Steagall Act as a
Test Case, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1285; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The

1190 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995
academics live with the frustrations of politicized decision
making while searching for analytical strategies that bring
coherence to the Court's work and effectuate congressional
intent.5
The primary goal of this article is to go beyond the "rule of
deferencev6 theory and explore how and why the Court
routinely rejects or ignores the interpretations offered by
foreigners when their views conflict with those of the executive.
By exposing the imbalance and unfairness of the Court's
approach, perhaps this article will open the door for remedial
measures.
This article does not provide an exhaustive historical
analysis of Supreme Court response to amici efforts, but rather
sets out several historical spotlights which illuminate the
futility of foreign arnici. This illumination is accomplished by
exploring three different types of amici "picketing": (1) purely
domestic, (2)domestic-foreign, and (3) purely foreign. The term
"amici picketing" refers both to formal brief submission as well
as extra-judicial activities intended to influence the Court.

Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647
(1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM.L.
REV. 749 (1995).
5. The primary mechanism for reining in the Court after statutory detours is
the congressional override. Initial popular outcry often crystallizes into concrete
advocacy which serves as a catalyst for congresspersons to introduce legislation
designed to overturn the Court's interpretation. The civil rights area is a constant
battlefield for the Court and Congress as evidenced by repeated congressional
overrulings of the Court's construction of civil rights statutes. For a discussion of
the ongoing battle between Congress and the Court, see Eric Schnapper, Statutory
Misinterpretations: A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTREDAME L. REV. 1095 (1993).
Another strategy used to avoid a harmful meaning assigned by the Court is to
litigate the issue before a judge who does not share the Court's view. For example,
in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), the Court ruled that
an employment discrimination plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of
law if he proves a prima facie case and also proves that the employer's defense
was a total fabrication. Id. a t 2747-48. The Court interpreted Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as requiring that
the employee show not only that the employer was lying, but that the lies were
intended to hide discrimination. However, the Hicks decision conceded that proof
from the prima facie case and proof that the employer's reason is incredible "may"
in some instances be sufficient to support a judgment for the employee. Id. a t
2749. This "loophole* gives judges who do not believe in the pretext-plus rule an
opportunity to rule for the employee without evidence that the real motivation for
the employer's decision was prohibited discriminatory animus.
6. See Bederman, supra note 1, a t 960-61, 1015-16 (noting that the rule of
deference is ingrained and has been taken to new heights by the Rehnquist Court).
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First, the article looks a t a scenario of purely domestic
protest and amici brief submission, noting this approach's
political nature, high costs and limited benefits. This inquiry is
fleshed out in a discussion of the Court's response to domestic
amici in statutory interpretation cases. The article traces the
Court's intermittent accountability when interpreting domestic
legislation to the integration of amici in the tripartite
democratic structure-a status foreign amici are unable to
achieve. Because foreign constituencies do not have access to
the democratic processes that help make the Court
ac~ountable,~
and because the American public seldom cares
about an executive interpretation that adversely affects
foreigners, principled construction becomes a weak weapon to
use in attacking the Court's rule of deference to the executive.
This article concludes that domestic protest and amicus
brief submissions have the most influence over the Court. But
even this approach has its limitations because it tends to be
temporary, especially when the Court is particularly activist.
Second, this article uses the Haitian refugee cases to
demonstrate the results that occur when the efforts of domestic
and foreign constituencies coalesce in exerting pressure on the
Court. The article concludes that this second approach will
more likely get the executive's attention, but will have little or
no effect on the Court.
Third, this article considers the effectiveness of purely
foreign extrajudicial and amici pressure, showing that this
approach is the least beneficial and is typically received with
judicial indifference. Because foreign critics have never been
able to impugn the Court's institutional legitimacy in any
meaningful way,8 the article concludes that focus on the
7. At the outset, Congress' role in treaty creation and interpretation is
limited. Participation in the process is limited to the Senate, US. CONST. art 11,
8 2, and senatorial interpretations are given little weight. See Bederman, supra
note 1, a t 959. In any event, a t the treaty-making stage, congressional focus is on
promoting national interests, not advocating for non-constituency foreign states. See
James C. Wolf, Comment, The Jurisprudence of Treaty Interpretation, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1023, 1058 (1988) (Senators rarely hear views of foreign treaty
parties and rely heavily on the executive when voting). Further, influence buying
through financial contributions is not an option for foreign nationals because they
are statutorily barred from doing so. See 2 U.S.C. 9 441(e) (1994); see also, Turley,
supra note 1, a t 250 (foreign interests must turn to the executive because Congress
is not readily accessible).
8. Although dismay can be found in narrow academic circles when the
Court's treaty construction is unprincipled, the outcry is never as widespread or
heartfelt as when the Court botches domestic legislation. It could be that, like the
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Court's interpretive methodology is misplaced. Absent an
internal political mechanism that triggers popular American
outcry, the Court will likely remain insulated fkom, and
indifferent to, foreign amici.

Applying public or political pressure on the United States
Supreme Court in order to shape its deliberations is
commonplace. Extrajudicial pressure tactics include marches,
mail, academic commentary, or even such radical
demonstrations as publicly displaying a fetus in a b ~ t t l e . ~
Attempts to influence are particularly notable when the Court
is adjudicating sensitive constitutional cases. While the Court
is theoretically insulated from political forces,1° there is
weighty evidence that such strategies sometimes influence
outcomes." In fact, there is evidence that the Justices
sometimes write opinions designed to incite public response, so
as to mold future interpretive deliberations.12
Another common form of potential influence on the Court
is amicus briefs.13 Such briefs are a prescribed part of the
Court's adjudicative mechanism,14 and are often preceded and
backed by public outcry. In constitutional and statutory

Court, most American scholars react to treaty language with aloofness, and have a
default rule of deference to both the executive and judiciary. A good part of the
explanation, however, probably lies in self-interest, in the sense that the American
populace and critics have no stake in challenging decisions that aggrandize
"American" privileges.
9. See Robert F. Nagel, Political Pressure and Judging in Constitutional
Cases, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 685 (1990).
10. Richard Delgado, Judicial Influences and the Inside-Outside Dichotomy: A
Comment On Professor Nagel, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 711 (1990); Larry G. Simon,
The Supreme Court's Independence: Accountability, Majoritarianism, and
Justifiation, Comments on Seidman, 6 1 S. C&. L. REV. 1607 (1988).
11. See Nagel, supra note 9, a t 697 ("[M]onumental civil rights decisions were
not the product of Justices oblivious to people in the streets.").
12. Professor Nagel offers as examples Justice Blackmuds dissent in the
abortion case Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 537 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), and Justice RRhnquistYsdissent in the flag burning case
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Nagel,
supra note 9, at 687-89.
13. For a discussion of the origins and development of amicus curiae, see
Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief- From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE
L.J. 694 (1963); Michael K. Lowman, Comment, The Litigating Amicus Curiae:
When Does the Party Begin After the Friends Leave, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1243
(1992).
14. See Sup. Ct. R. 37.
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interpretation cases, domestic amici have sometimes had
persuasive impact on the Court.'' Patterson v. McClean Credit
some good insights into how local protest filters
~ n i o n offers
'~
through our domestic processes and affects judicial conclusions.

A. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union
Patterson is a good example of the influence of domestic
amici on the Court's interpretive choices. At issue in Patterson
was a civil rights statute, 5 1981, which provides that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, t o sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
fidl and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other. l7

Brenda Patterson sued her employer under this provision
alleging racial harassment on the job. The district court dismissed her complaint, finding that § 1981 does not police racial
harassment while employed. The court of appeals agreed, finding that § 1981 regulates only the right to make and enforce
contracts, not terms and conditions of empl~yment.'~
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in order to determine
whether it should extend Runyon v. McCrary'slg prohibition of
private contractual discrimination to on-the-job discrimination.
In 1976, the Court had decided in Runyon that 5 1981 prohibits
discrimination by private bodies."
The Court heard arguments in Patterson in February 1988.
However, a short time later it ordered the parties to reargue
the case, this time requesting that they address the question of

15. See, e.g., Susan Hedman, Friends of the Earth and Friends of the Court:
Assessing the Impact of Interest Group Amici Curiae i n Environmental Cases
Decided by the Supreme Court, 10 VA. ENVTL.L.J. 187 (1991); David S. Ruder,
Address, The Development of Legal Doctrine Through Amicus Participation: The
SEC Experience, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1167.
16. 491 U.S. 164 (1989), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
17. 42 U.S.C. 8 1981(a) (1988).
18. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986)
afPd in part, vacated in part, 491 U.S. 164 (1994), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1994).
19. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
20. Id. at 171-74.
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whether the Runyon Court's interpretation of 9 1981 was correct. The decision to test the legitimacy of Runyon triggered a
firestorm of criticism from many segments of American sociall, neither party to the lawsuit had questioned
e t ~ . After
~'
the legality of Runyon and that issue was not before the Court.
Congress as well as civil rights, labor, and religious groups,
among others, saw this move by the Court as an attempt by
conservative Justices to roll back important civil rights protection; these groups filed amicus briefs with the Court arguing
that Runyon was correctly decided.22The briefs apparently
influenced the Court as evidenced by its ruling that even if
Runyon was not correctly decided, stare decisis supported deference to its interpretation that $ 1981 prohibits private dis~ r i m i n a t i o n .The
~ ~ Court stated that: "Whether Runyon's interpretation of $ 1981 as prohibiting racial discrimination in
the making and enforcement of private contracts is right or
wrong as an original matter, it is certain that it is not inconsistent with the prevailing sense of justice in this c0unt1-y."~~
The influence of amici in Patterson can hardly be overstated. In Patterson the Court interpreted 5 1981 as not prohibiting
on-the-job discrimination although the language of the statute
In addition, the Court
is susceptible to such a constru~tion.~~

21. See Reginald C. Govan, Framing Issues and Acquiring Codes: An Overview
of the Legislative Sojourn of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 41 DEPAULL. REV. 1057,
1063 (1992) ("That request by the Supreme Court unleashed a firestorm of opposition from Congress, religious groups, and the civil rights and labor communities,
all of whom filed amicus briefs essentially saying to the Court, 'Don't you dare.'"
(footnote omitted)); Barbara L. Kramer, Comment, Runyon Reconsidered: The Future of Section 1981 as a Basis for Employment Discrimination Claims, 38 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 251, 268 n.178 (1990) ("No one could have expected the organized
outcry generated by the order. By early June, a coalition of 112 civic groups, 47
state attorneys general, 66 U.S. senators, and 118 members of the House of Representatives were preparing amicus briefs in defense of Runyon.").
22. See Govan, supra note 21 a t 1063; Kramer, supra note 21 a t 268.
23. See Govan, supra note 21 a t 1063. ("Ultimately, the Court, backing down
from a frontal attack on the scope of section 1981, reaffirmed its earlier decision in
Runyon.") (footnote omitted); see also Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It":
The Case For An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177,
179 n. 12 (1989) ("Perhaps an argument can be made that the decision to reaffirm
Runyon was not really based on stare decisis, but was a response to the remarkable public outcry accompanying the Court's announcement that it would reconsider
Runyon .").
24. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174 (1989) superseded
by statute, 42 U.S.C. 1981 (1994).
25. Id. at 177. The Court ruled that the statute's prohibition was limited to
discrimination in the hiring process. It found that "make" related to discriminatory
offers and refusals to contract, id. a t 176, and that "enforce" only related to an
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rejected critical legislative history on the statute's origin and
evolution which showed that it was "designed to protect the
freedmen from the imposition of working conditions that evidence an intent on the part of the employer not to contract on
nondiscriminatory terms."26 Retention of Runyon's prohibition
of private discrimination was one of a few victories discrimination victims enjoyed when the Court completely constricted the
ambit of 5 1981 in Patterson.
Patterson left discrimination victims with limited protection and left the Runyon decision open to future challenge.
While arnici input in Patterson may have shielded Runyon, that
protection was only superficial because the Court did not rule
that Runyon correctly interpreted 5 1981. Civil rights advocates
had to step up their efforts politically and persuade Congress
that the Court's decision in Patterson was wrong. After a two
year battle, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1 9 9 1 , ~ ~
which included a provision that essentially overruled Patterson
and provided more security for R ~ n y o n . ~ ~
As Patterson illustrates, amici protest requires backing
from an array of institutional organizations, which serve as
reflectors of public outcry. Couple this with the check of Congress as a "veto-empowered" coordinate branch, and the potential to chart the Court's interpretive course can be realized. But
the democratic model as an institutional restraint on the
Court's wayward interpretive choices is unreliable because the
Court has demonstrated a willingness to act outside of constitutional constraints. In the civil rights area, for example, the
Court has been willing to revisit statutory provisions after
congressional amendments in order to 'legislate" its preferences.29
individual's right to equal access to the legal process, id. a t 177.
26. Id. a t 206 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
28. Id. 5 101. The relevant provisions provide: "For purposes of this section,
the term 'make and enforce contracts' includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." Id. 5 lOl(b). To insulate
Runyon, Congress also provided: "The rights protected by this section are protected
against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color
of State law." Id. 5 101(c).
29. The Court's decision to return and review burden allocations in disparate
treatment cases soon after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was passed is one example.
See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (holding that
plaintiff's proof that an employer's defense is a lie is not sufficient to support judg-
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B. Democratic Rigors As Check On Judicial Abuse
The Court's willingness to offer interpretations grounded in
popular majoritarian preferences also undermines the notion
that the Court is most susceptible to influence when protest is
grounded in and filters through the rigors of the democratic
process. Recent examples include the Court's hurried lead in
defining the parameters for civil rights3' and affirmative acin these areas show that the Court sometimes
t i ~ n . ~Cases
'
assumes the role of political pollster and offers interpretations
consistent with popular majoritarian sentiments prior to the
appropriate coordinate branch acting. The Court's majoritarian
action preempts domestic popular outcry and amici-the most
powerful type of nonparty protest.
National civil rights attention has moved from sympathy
and support for minorities32 to concerns about the rights of
"innocent white victims." In the public sphere, polls suggest a
growing concern among caucasians regarding affirmative action
programs.33 This unpopularity has set executive, legislative,
and judicial forces in motion.
At the political level, "angry-white-male[s]" have voted
their opposition by abandoning the Democratic Party and help. ~ ~ individuals
ing Republicans gain control of C ~ n g r e s s These
are also supporting ballot initiatives that would eliminate preferential programs instituted by state government^.^^ Presidential hopefuls have tapped into affirmative action's disfavor to

ment as a matter of law).
30. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct.
2475 (1995).
31. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
32. As late as 1991, "rainbow" support could be found for minority-protective
schemes. Civil rights advocates were able to overcome a presidential veto and return with bipartisan support sufficient to secure passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
33. Richard Lacayo, A New Push for Blind Justice, TIME,Feb. 20, 1995, a t
39; Steven V. Roberts, Affirmative Action on the Eclge, U.S. NEWS & WORLDREP.,
Feb. 13, 1995, a t 32.
34. See Angie Cannon, Stand up for What Works, Clinton Urges, MIAMIHERALD, April 9, 1995, a t A13 (While Clinton was trying to placate the Democrats
who have long been supporters of affirmative action, he also was trying to appease
the so-called angry-white-male voters, who abandoned the Democratic Party in
droves in November and helped catapult Republicans to power.").
35. See id.; see also Angie Cannon & Donna St. George, Clinton Stands Firm
July 20, 1995, a t A5; Peter Schrag, Son of
on Afirmative Action, MIAMI HERALD,
187, NEW REPUBLIC,January 30, 1995, a t 16.

FOREIGN AMICI
galvanize the Republican party, divide Democrats, and appeal
to suburban white male voters.36At the legislative level, Senator Dole and others have threatened to introduce legislation to
ban preferential schemes grounded in race or gender.37At the
executive level, President Clinton is reviewing an array of preferential programs in order to weed out the "unnecessary" ones
and placate Democrats and white swing voters.38
The scores of preferential schemes a t issue have their genesis in executive orders, statutes, and other regulatory
schemes. Furthermore, the public concerns that triggered the
creation of these programs are now giving way to public outcry
that seeks their elimination. Rather than wait for statutory or
regulatory repeal, the Supreme Court joined the fray and decided Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pens:' a minority set-aside
case. In a decision that smacks of popular white anger, the
Court ruled that any public preferential scheme grounded in
This conrace must be subjected to strict scrutiny analy~is.~'
clusion effectively overruled two Supreme Court precedents
which established a lesser level of scrutiny for federal actors."
Adarand also sends a grim signal to supporters of employment affirmative action schemes, soon after these supporters
were able to salvage some preferential programs in Congress.
After expending a great deal of political energy and bargaining
chips on the Civil Rights Act of 1991:~ civil rights advocates

36. See Howard Fineman, Race and Rage, NEWSWEEK,April 3, 1995, a t 23;
Dave Lesher & Amy Wallace, Battle Looms on Move to Color-Blind Colleges, MIAMI
HERALD,July 22, 1995, a t A14; Carl Mollins, A White Male Backlash, MCCLEAN'S,
March 20, 1995, a t 22.
37. See Harvey Berkman, Guide to Afirmative Action is Sent to Agencies,
NAT'LL.J., July 17, 1995, at A12.
38. Fineman, supra note 36, a t 22. The President's first report released on
July 19, 1995, concluded that federal affirmative action programs are necessary
and fair. See Harvey Berkman, Clinton Report Makes Case for Afirmative Action,
N A T L.J.,
~
July 31, 1995, at A l l .
39. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
40. Id.
41. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (permitting
intermediate scrutiny of two FCC policies that gave preferences to racial minorities), overruled by, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. (1995); Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (holding that federal preferential programs need
not be subjected to the most searching judicial inquiry because the federal government stands above racial politics).
42. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified largely in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the political energy expended to secure
passage, see Stephen A. Plass, Bedrock Principles, Elusive Construction, and the
Future of Equal Employment Laws, 21 HOFSTRAL. REV. 313 (1992).

,
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were able to protect schemes recognized as legal at that
time.43In view of Adarand, it is doubtful the Court intends to
wait on congressional initiatives designed to roll back or eliminate employment preferential schemes." In 1991, affirmative
action opponents did not have the political muscle to legislate
~
now, they may not
affirmative action out of Title V I I . ~Even
have the popular or legislative strength to statutorily ban such
preferences. But the Court's alliance with this majoritarian
cause will likely keep it off the sidelines. Whether or not there
is sufficient public support or congressional will to legislate out
employment preferences, the Court is likely to find congressional intent barring such programs, or congressional indecision
As' ~ ~
a result, even
and deference to the Court's " e ~ p e r t i s e . ~
domestic efforts which sometimes yield principled results remain costly and susceptible to future Court activism.

11. FOREIGN
AND DOMESTICPROTEST
COMBINED
Another approach picketers may use to influence the Court
combines foreign and domestic protest and amicus brief submission. This approach is sometimes pursued in treaty interpretation cases. The United States Constitution recognizes
treaties as the law of the land. Clause 2 of Article VI provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in

43. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 5 116, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991) ("Nothing in
the amendments made by this title shall be construed to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements, that are in accordance with the
law.").
44. Several bills already have been sponsored by Senator Helms. See Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1995, S. 26, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also S.
318, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
45. Republican opponents of affirmative action settled for statements in the
record such as Senator Hatch's comment that "[the Act] expresses neither congressional approval nor disapproval of any judicial decision affecting court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements."). See 137 CONG.REC.S15,320
(daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
46. The Court took this route when it was called upon to say whether the
1991 Civil Rights Act applied retroactively. See Landgraf v. US1 Film Prod., 114 S.
Ct. 1483 (1994); Rivers v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994) (holding that
the Act does not apply retroactively and that statutory text and legislative history
suggest that Congress failed to resolve this issue).

FOREIGN AMICI
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not~ithstanding.~~

The Constitution also provides an advice and consent role for
the Senate in the treaty-making process.48
The Constitution vests the Supreme Court with final authority to interpret treaties:'
and the jurisprudential rules for
treaty interpretation are akin to those utilized in statutory
construction cases. In that regard, the Court has long recognized that textual mandates should take precedence; when text
is clear it should be given its obvious meaning.50In harmony
with its position of textual preeminence, the Court has also
noted that interpretations offered by the executive are not
c o n ~ l u s i v e yet
, ~ ~ historically the Court has gone on to adopt
Further,
such interpretations no matter how ~ontroversial.~~
the Court may be influenced by express senatorial declarations
made at the time a treaty is ratified.53In contrast, interpretations offered by foreign treaty parties have been rejected54or
47. U.S. CONST.art. VI, cl. 2.
48. U.S. CONST.art. 11, 5 2 ("He [the President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds
of the Senators present concur . . . .").
49. U.S. CONST.art. 111, 5 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .").
50. Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 52-54 (1963); see also United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992) (text is the first source of
guidance).
51. However, the Court has also repeatedly concluded that such interpretations should be given great weight. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., v. Avagliano,
457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1992) ("Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to
treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and
enforcement is entitled to great weight."); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194
(1960) ('While courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by
the department of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight." (footnote omitted)); see also Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 US. 276, 295 (1933).
52. Recent examples include the Haitian Refugee and Alvarez-Machain cases.
See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
53. See Bederman, supra note 1, a t 959. For a broader discussion of the
Senate's role in treaty making and interpretation, see Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 571 (1991).
54. See Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 113 S. Ct. 1095 (1993). In
Itel, an American cargo container company argued that it was exempt from state
sales tax because, among other things, this tax conflicted with two international
conventions to which the United States is a signatory. Id. at 1098. To support this
argument, Itel relied heavily on an amicus brief filed by the United Kingdom
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ignored55although foreign governments have been encouraged
by the United States State Department to file amicus briefs.56
Foreign amici's failure is in some measure due to the historic rule of deference to executive interpretations?? But this
is only part of the story. The opinions, actions, and inaction of
foreign governments have played a role in the Court's interpretive work, but only when they confirm and buttress executive
interpretations? The Court's selective consideration and reliwhich demonstrated that the United Kingdom imposed no such tax on container
leases of that kind. Id. a t 1100. The Court rejected this argument and other supporting evidence by noting that:
As further evidence in support of its position, Itel points to the statements of signatory nations objecting to Tennessee's taxation of container
leases. With all due respect to those statements, we adhere to our interpretation. We are mindful that 11 nations (Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom), each a signatory to a t least one Container Convention
have sent a diplomatic note to the United States Department of State
submitting that they do not "impose sales taxes (or equivalent taxes of
different nomenclatures) on the lease of cargo containers that are used in
international commerce among the Contracting Parties to the Conventions."
Id. a t 1100-01 (quoting Appendix to Brief for United Kingdom and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae a t la, Itel, 113 S. Ct. 1095).
55. In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), no reference to
Mexico's amicus brief was made in the majority opinion. The persuasive interpretation offered by Mexico as amicus had to be developed in dissent. See id. a t 671
n.1, 673-75 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. See Diplomatic Missions and Embassy Property: Communications to
Courts, 1978 DIGEST§ 1, a t 560 (discussing the switch from diplomatic notes transmitted to the Court to amicus briefs).
57. See generally Arthur M . Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1988). For a discussion associating this deference
with conservative Justices, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Is the Rehnquist Court Really
that Conservative?: An Analysis of the 1991-92 Term, 26 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 987
(1993). For discussions on how this deferential posture plays itself out in immigration matters, see Johnson, supra note 4; and Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALEL.J. 545 (1990).
58. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985), in which the Court relied on
the "opinions" expressed by signatories of the Warsaw Convention made a t a n
international conference on air law, in interpreting that treaty's use of the word
"accident." The Court ruled, "'we find the opinions of our sister signatories to be
entitled to considerable weight.'" Id. a t 404 (citing Benjamins v. British European
Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 US. 1114 (1979)); see
also id. a t 403 ("Reference to the conduct of the parties to the Convention . . .
helps clarify the meaning of the term.").
The Court's willingness to rely on the conduct of foreign states when it coincides with the executive's interpretation is evidenced by several decisions. See
Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 US. 243 (1984), which relied on
the past practice of foreign states to interpret the air cargo liability limitation
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ance on foreign sources highlights the potential influence these
sources may have when presented to the Court in the form of
amici. Yet that potential has gone unrealized for so long that it
is evident that that form of protest suffers significant limitations. The Haitian refugee cases illustrate some of the weaknesses of foreign amici, even of foreign amici who have domestic constituencies rallying by their side.

A. Domestic Interpretation of the INA and Refugee Protocol
The Haitian refugee crisis arose when, on May 23, 1992
President Bush by Executive Order implemented a policy of
interdicting refugees in international waters and returning
them to their country of origin without screening to determine

provision of the Warsaw Convention. Siding with the executive's interpretation that
the Convention's liability limit remains enforceable, the Court stated: "Our task of
construing those purposes is, however, made considerably easier by the 50 years of
consistent international and domestic practices under the Convention." Id. a t 255.
The Court added:
We may not ignore the actual, reasonably harmonious practice adopted by
the United States and other signatories in the first 40 years of the
Convention's existence. In determining whether the Executive Branch's
domestic implementation of the Convention is consistent with the
Convention's terms, our task is to construe a "contract" among nations.
The conduct of the contracting parties in implementing that contract in
the first 50 years of its operation cannot be ignored.
Id. a t 259-60 (citations omitted); see also Sumitomo Shoji America Inc. v.
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1981) (the Court accepted an interpretation of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty offered by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs). In Sumitomo, the Court noted that "Moth the Ministry of Foreign AfYairs of
Japan and the United States Department of State agree that a United States corporation, even when wholly owned by a Japanese company, is not a company of
Japan under the Treaty and is therefore not covered by Article VIII(1). . . .
Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to
great weight." Id. a t 183-85.
An example of foreign state inaction serving a s a reliable interpretive guide can
be found in O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986). In O'Connor the Court
relied on the government of Panama's silence as support for the Court's conclusion
that the Panama Canal Treaty did not exempt from United States income taxes
certain employees of the Panama Canal Commission. The Court found that
[ilt is undisputed that, pursuant to clear Executive Branch policy, the
Panama Canal Commission consistently withheld United States income
taxes from petitioners and others similarly situated and that Panama,'
which had four of its own nationals on the Board of the Commission, did
not object. The course of conduct of parties to an international agreement,
like the course of conduct of parties to any contract, is evidence of its
meaning.
Id. a t 33 (citations omitted).
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their eligibility for asylum.59Although the order did not men-

59. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992), reprinted in 8 U.S.C.

8 1182 (1994). The Executive Order reads:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and
the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and
215(a)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C.
1182(f) and 1185(a)(l) . . .), and whereas:
(1) The President has authority to suspend the entry of aliens coming
by sea to the United States without necessary documentation, to establish
reasonable rules and regulations regarding, and other limitations on, the
entry or attempted entry of aliens into the United States, and to repatriate aliens interdicted beyond the territorial sea of the United States;
(2) The international legal obligations of the United States under the
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (U.S. T.I.A.S.
6577; 19 U.S.T. 6223) to apply Article 33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees do not extend to persons located
outside the territory of the United States;
(3) Proclamation No. 4865 [set out [above]] suspends the entry of all
undocumented aliens into the United States by the high seas; and
(4) There continues to be a serious problem of persons attempting to
come to the United States by sea without necessary documentation and
otherwise illegally;
I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of America, hereby
order as follows:
SECTION 1. The Secretary of State shall undertake to enter into, on
behalf of the United States, cooperative arrangements with appropriate
foreign governments for the purpose of preventing illegal migration to the
United States by sea.
SEC. 2. (a) The Secretary of the Department in which the Coast
Guard is operating, in consultation, where appropriate, with the Secretary
of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of State, shall issue
appropriate instructions to the Coast Guard in order to enforce the suspension of the entry of undocumented aliens by sea and the interdiction
of any defined vessel carrying such aliens.
(b) Those instructions shall apply to any of the following defined vessels:
(1) Vessels of the United States, meaning any vessel documented or
numbered pursuant to the laws of the United States, or owned in whole
or in part by the United States, a citizen of the United States, or a corporation incorporated under the laws of the United States or any State,
Territory, District, Commonwealth, or possession thereof, unless the vessel
has been granted nationality by a foreign nation in accord with Article 5
of the Convention on the High Seas of 1958 (U.S. T.I.A.S. 5200; 13 U.S.T.
2312).
(2) Vessels without nationality or vessels assimilated to vessels without nationality in accordance with paragraph (2) of Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas of 1958 (U.S. T.I.A.S. 5200; 13 U.S.T. 2312).
(3) Vessels of foreign nations with whom we have arrangements authorizing the United States to stop and board such vessels.
(c) Those instructions to the Coast Guard shall include appropriate
directives providing for the Coast Guard:
(1)To stop and board defined vessels, when there is reason to believe
that such vessels are engaged in the irregular transportation of persons
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tion Haiti, a contemporaneous press release made it clear that
the order was directed at Haitian refugees?' This policy was
or violations of United States law or the law of a country with which the
United States has an arrangement authorizing such action.
(2) To make inquiries of those on board, examine documents and take
such actions as are necessary to carry out this order.
(3) To return the vessel and its passengers to the country from which
it came, or to another country, when there is reason to believe that an
offense is being committed against the United States immigration laws, or
appropriate laws of a foreign country with which we have an arrangement to assist; provided, however, that the Attorney General, in his unreviewable discretion, may decide that a person who is a refugee will not
be returned without his consent.
(d) These actions, pursuant to this section, are authorized to be undertaken only beyond the territorial sea of the United States.
SEC. 3. This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the Executive Branch. Neither this order nor any agency guidelines, procedures, instructions, directives, rules or regulations implementing this order shall create, or shall be construed to create, any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural (including without limitation any right
or benefit under the Administrative Procedure Act [5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.,
701 et seq. . . .I), legally enforceable by any party against the United
States, its agencies or instrumentalities, officers, employees, or any other
person. Nor shall this order be construed to require any procedures to determine whether a person is a refugee.
SEC. 4. Executive Order No. 12324 is hereby revoked and replaced by
this order.
SEC. 5. This order shall be effective immediately.
60. See White House Statement on Haitian Migrants, 28 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 924 (May 24, 1992).
President Bush has issued an Executive order which will permit the
U.S. Coast Guard to begin returning Haitians picked up a t sea directly to
Haiti. This action follows a large surge in Haitian boat people seeking to
enter the United States and is necessary to protect the lives of the Haitians, whose boats are not equipped for the 600 mile sea journey.
The large number of Haitian migrants has led to a dangerous and
unmanageable situation. Both the temporary processing facility a t the
U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo and the Coast Guard cutters on patrol are
filled to capacity. The President's action will also allow continued orderly
processing of more than 12,000 Haitians presently a t Guantanamo.
Through broadcasts on the Voice of America and public statements in
the Haitian media, we continue to urge Haitians not to attempt the dangerous sea journey to the United States. Last week alone, 18 Haitians
perished when their vessel capsized off the Cuban coast.
Under current circumstances, the safety of Haitians is best assured by
remaining in their country. We urge any Haitians who fear persecution to
avail themselves of our refugee processing service a t our Embassy in
Port-au-Prince. The Embassy has been processing refugee claims since
February. We utilize this special procedure in only four countries in the
world. We are prepared to increase the American Embassy staff in Haiti
for refugee processing if necessary.
The United States Coast Guard has picked up over 34,000 since the
coup in Haiti last September 30. Senior U.S. officials are seeking the
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criticized by candidate and President-elect Clinton who vowed
to reverse it upon taking office." However, just prior to inauguration, Clinton reversed his position and adopted the Bush
policy of forced repatriation without s ~ r e e n i n g . ~ ~
Clinton's decision to continue the Bush policy implicated
both domestic statutory law,63 international con~entions,6~
and a cooperative agreement between the United States and
~ a i t i ?However, political concerns appeared to be the driving
force for the President's decision. For instance, many support-

assistance of other countries and the United Nations to help deal with
the plight of Haitian boat people, and we will continue our intensive
efforts to find alternative solutions to avoid further tragedies on the high
seas.
The President has also directed an intensification of our ongoing humanitarian assistance efforts in Haiti. Our current programs total $47
million and provide food for over 600,000 Haitians and health care services which reach nearly 2 million. We hope other nations will also increase
their humanitarian assistance as called for in the resolution on Haiti
passed by the OAS foreign ministers on May 17.
61. See Christopher Marquis, Clinton: Summary Repatriations to Haiti to End,
MIAMIHERALD,Nov. 13, 1992, a t A24.
62. Aides Say Clinton Will Extend Policy on Returning Haitians, WASH. POST,
Jan. 14, 1993, a t Al.
~ Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
63. The Immigration and ~ a t i o n a l i tAct,
(1952) (codified as amended in various sections of 8 U.S.C.).
64. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July
28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. The United States acceded to the
convention on Jan. 31, 1967. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
65. Agreement effected by exchange of notes; signed a t Port-au-Prince September 23, 1981: This interdiction agreement dealt with the subject of illegal immigration. It provides in relevant part:
The United States Government confirms the understandings discussed
by representatives of our two governments for the establishment of a
cooperative program of interdiction and selective return to Haiti of certain
Haitian migrants and vessels involved in illegal transport of persons coming from Haiti.

...
The United States Government appreciates the assurances which it
has received from the Government of the Republic of Haiti that Haitians
returned to their country and who are not traffickers will not be subject
to prosecution for illegal departure.
It is understood that under these arrangements the United States
Government does not intend to return to Haiti any Haitian migrants
whom the United States authorities determine qualify for refugee status.

...
[This accord] shall continue in force until six months from the date
either government gives notice to the other of its intention to terminate
the agreement.
19 U.S.T. 6223.
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ers of fleeing Haitians viewed President Bush's institution of
the repatriation policy as partly motivated by racism66 especially since Cubans were simultaneously being warmly received?? Clinton certainly did not want this label, particularly
from blacks and Haitian immigrants who are generally supporters of the Democratic party. Once in office, however,
Clinton had to respond to a national constituency which increasingly has voiced its disfavor with the heavy immigrant inPressure also came from groups and officials opposed to
the admission of Haitian refugees, including state and county
officials from Florida6' whose call for an exclusionary policy
for Haitian refugees coincided with a fairly widespread desire
for increased immigration enforcement." In effect, the deci-

66. See Malissia Lennox, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique of the
United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687 (1993); Cheryl
Little, United States Haitian Policy: A History of Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L. SCH.J.
HUM. RTS. 269 (1993); see also HAITI PARADIGM, supra note 1, a t 2422 ("[Tlhe
archetypal 'good' alien favored by American immigration law is a white, European,
healthy, heterosexual, self-sufficient refugee, arriving alone in search of political
asylum--Mikhail Baryshnikov, for example . . . ."); Motomura, supra note 57, a t
587-89 (discussing race discrimination against Haitians in the context of constitutional and statutory law).
67. See Andres Viglucci & Paul Anderson, Immigration Nominee Opposes
Special Treatment for Cubans, MIAMI HERALD,June 19, 1993, a t A1 ("Doris
Meissner, nominated by President Clinton on Friday to be immigration commissioner, has advocated repeal of the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act, saying the special
treatment it affords to Cuban refugees over Haitians and other immigrants is 'a
national embarrassment.'").
68. There is some evidence that both Presidents Bush and Clinton had
learned hard political lessons from previous immigration crises. For example, the
Marie1 boatlifi had hurt the Carter administration and cost Clinton the governor's
office in Arkansas. See Jonathan Atler, This Boy's Life, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 13, 1995,
a t 32; Matthew Cooper, Clinton's Last Comeback, U.S. NEWS & WORLDREP., July
20, 1992, at 32; Gary Wills, Beginning of the Road, TIME,July 20, 1992, a t 33, 59.
For a critique of the role anti-immigrant sentiments may have played, see HAITI
PARADIGM,
supra note 1, a t 2410-11.
69. For example, Florida Republican Senator Connie Mack, although opposed
to the Bush policy of repatriation, was primarily concerned about any changes that
could lead to mass entry that would negatively impact South Florida. Nancy
Wittenberg, the state's refugee coordinator, similarly stated that she hoped President Bill Clinton would prohibit mass entries because the state of Florida and
Dade County were experiencing tough economic times and therefore were unprepared to handle large numbers of Haitian immigrants. See Paul Anderson, Clinton's
Florida Ties Put to Test, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 8, 1992, a t A26.
70. Tolerance for new immigrants has faded over the years, resulting in increasing cries for more stringent immigration laws. See Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial
Acquiescence to the Executive Branch's Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic
Agendas in Immigration Matters: The Case of the Haitian Asylum Seekers, 7 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1993).
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sion on Haitian refugees got caught up in election politics and
community agitation stemming from a slow economy, high
unemployment, and limited governmental resources at all leve1s.71
But fleeing Haitians had broad-based support for their
case. Besides wide-ranging popular support,72able legal muscle joined the fray,?3along with civil and human rights organi.~~
Clinton's inz a t i o n ~and
~ ~ members of C o n g r e ~ s President
terpretation of American immigration laws and the interdiction
agreement between the United States and Haiti was therefore
made in the context of possible popular constituency fallout and
congressional involvement in revising the Immigration and
Nationality Act.
National political concerns, real or speculative, seem to
have dominated executive thinking about Haitian asylum seekers. Though it seems clear that the original repatriation order
did not stem from a genuine interpretation of refugee laws, the
71. See Johnson, supra note 70, a t 16-18.
72. See Holly Idelson, Black Leaders Criticize Continuation of Policy, 51
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 520 (1993) (black leaders oppose the Clinton repatriation
policy which denies Haitians opportunity to state their claims.); Christopher J.
Farley, Reading, Writing, 'Rithmetic, Rage, TIME, April 19, 1993, a t 15 (students
rally in support of Haitian refugees); William Gibson, President George Bush's Policy on Haitians is Indefensible, Cruel Racism, CRISIS, June-July 1992, a t 6 (dancer
and choreographer Katherine Dunham goes on hunger strike and calls Bush's Haitian policy undemocratic); Sally Guard, For the Record, SPORTSILLUSTRATED,
Sep.
21, 1992, a t 66 (Arthur Ashe and others protesting treatment of Haitians arrested
in front of White House); Notes of Protest, NATION,March 29, 1993, a t 401 (Yale
students hold protest, teach-in, rally and hunger strike in support of Haitian refugees).
supra note 1, a t 2395 n.21. The Haitian Refugee
73. See HAITI PARADIGM,
Center in Miami also filed suits continuing their advocacy on behalf of fleeing Haitians. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla.)
(suing and obtaining preliminary injunction against interdiction policy), injunction
dissolved, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992); see
also Victoria Clawson et al., Essay, Litigating as Law Students: An Inside Look a t
Haitian Centers Council, 103 YALEL.J. 2337 (1994).
74. See, e.g., Bernard Diederich, Send 'Em Back!, TIME, June 8, 1992, a t 43
(noting the participation of the U.S. Catholic Conference's Office of Migration and
Refugee Services); Bill Frelick, Haitians a t Sea: Asylum Denied, REPORTSON THE
AMERICAS,July 1992, at 34 (noting the involvement of human rights activists and
movements); Lydio F. Tomasi, End the Haitian Refugee Crisis, MIGRATIONWORLD
MAG., May-June 1992, a t 52 (condemning the repatriation policy as shameful and
noting the political efforts of the Center for Migration Studies in support of Haitian refugees).
75. See Pamela Fessler, Members Decry Haiti Policy, Vow to Seek Changes,
CONG.Q. WEY. REP. 1547 (1992) (many legislators view President Bush's Haitian
refugee policy as an election year political ploy and will introduce legislation to
overturn it).
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Clinton Administration defended its continuation of the Bush
policy and argued before the Supreme Court in Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, Inc. that neither United States immigration
laws nor the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Section 243(h)(l), the conRefugees apply e~traterritorially.~~
tested provision of the Immigration Act, provides in relevant
part:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . .
to a country if the Attorney General determines that such
alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."

Article 33 of the Protocol provides in relevant part: "No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refoulern)a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life
or freedom would be threatened. . . .n78The United States
ratified the Protocol in 1967.~'
Prior to the litigation in Sale, the United States had taken
the position that the Protocol's provision on return (refouler)
applied to the high seas?' Despite this acknowledgment and
strong textual support for this interpretation, the government
argued the opposite throughout the litigation. The government
also knew that political persecution was common in Haiti with
its long history of coups and political bloodshed, the most recent associated with the ouster of the first democratically electThe government ared President, Jean Bertrand Ari~tide.~'
gued that, read as a whole, the INA does not apply to actions
taken by the President or Coast Guard outside the United
States.82 Further, the government asserted that the statute's
negotiations history supported this interpretati~n?~
The gov-

76. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
77. 8 U.S.C. 8 1253(h)(1)(1988).
78. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
79. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
80. See Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2568 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Andrew I.
Schoenholtz, Aiding and Abetting Persecutors: The Seizure and Return of Haitian
Refugees in Violation of the U.N.Refugees Convention and Protocol, 7 GEO.IMMIGR.
L.J. 67, 72-73 (1993).
81. See Johnson, supra note 70, at 11-14.
82. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2558.
83. Id. at 2558-59.

1208 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995
ernment made the same argument for Article 33 of the Protocol, contending that its text and negotiations history do not
support extraterritorial a p p l i ~ a t i o n . ~ ~
It is very difficult, however, to impose this interpretation
on the INA and Protocol which seemingly contain plain language. The INA provides that the Attorney General shall not
deport or return any alien.85This prohibition is explicit. Moreover, this language amends the previous textual formulation:
"The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportat i ~ n . "When
~ ~ the current text of the INA is juxtaposed
against its predecessor, there is an evident design to limit the
Attorney General's powers of repatriation. Congress went further when it amended the INA in 1980. Besides the limitation
on the Attorney General, Congress added the word "return"
after "deport," thereby broadening the literal and legal ambit of
' addition, Congress removed the limitation
the ~ t a t u t e . ~In
"within the United States" that appeared in the old INA in
order to eliminate any territorial constraints on the statute's
a p p l i ~ a t i o n .Nonetheless,
~~
the Court concluded that the statute does not apply extraterritorially."
Because Congress limited the power of the Attorney General in the areas of deportations and returns, the Court relied on
elusive distinctions among powers of the President, the Attorney General, and the Coast Guard in reaching its conclusion.
Using the presumption that acts of Congress ordinarily do not
apply outside United States territory, the Court interpreted
section 243(h)(1) as regulating only the Attorney General in
The Court further
carrying out her normal responsibilitie~.~~
reasoned that the INA provided a grant of presidential powers
that superseded the limitations imposed on the Attorney General.gl Therefore, the Court found that even if Congress had
restricted the Attorney General from acting extraterritorially to
return asylum seekers, the same restriction did not apply to
the President or the Coast Guard.92 This analytical ploy

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id.
8 U.S.C.$ 1253(h)(l).
Pub. L. No. 82-414, $ 243(h), 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
See Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2574 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2574-75.
Id. at 2560-63.
Id. at 2559-60.

Id.
See id. at 2559.
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prompted Justice Blackmun to comment: "The majority suggests indirectly that the law which the Coast Guard enforces
when it carries out the order to return a vessel reasonably
believed to be violating the immigration laws is somehow not a
law that the Attorney General is charged with administering.
That suggestion is
In fact, the much contested history of 243(h) and its ultimate amendment in 1980 demonstrate an intent to ensure its conformity with Article 33 of the
~rotocol.~~
The Court also agreed with the government's argument
that Article 33 of the Protocol does not apply extraterritorially.
Faced with clear language that contravened its interpretation,
the Court resorted to ''legal meaning" analysis to construe the
word "return" rather than accept its ordinary or literal meaning. The Court condemned dictionary definitions of return and
refouler although dictionaries have become a standard tool in
the Court's interpretive
Instead, the Court relied on
its fabricated interpretive device (legal meaning) which, when
applied to the word "return," produced a meaning narrower
than its ordinary, literal, or customary meaning.96The Court
decided that the legal meaning of "return" refers to the exclusion of aliens and that:
The drafters of the Convention and the parties to the Protocol-like the drafters of section 243(h)-may
not have contemplated that any nation would gather fleeing refhgees and
return them to the one country they had desperately sought
to escape; such actions may even violate the spirit of Article
33; but a treaty cannot impose uncontemplated extraterritorial obligations on those who ratify it through no more than
its general humanitarian intent."

93. Id. a t 2573 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
94. See Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 386-88 (1985).
95. See David 0.Stewart, By the Book, A.B.A. J., July 1993, a t 46 ("An informal survey reveals that in decisions announced between Jan. 1, 1992 and May
17, 1993, the justices [sic] recited dictionary definitions of key phrases 54 times in
38 cases, drawing on 23 different dictionaries. About half of the definitions came
from legal dictionaries, with the rest pulled from a variety of general compendia.
By contrast, in 1951-52 the Court recited dictionary definitions in opinions in only
four cases.").
96. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2563-64.
97. Id. a t 2565.
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Like the treatment of customary international law in the
Machain case, international obligations were given only lip
service.
The Court found further support for its interpretation of
the Protocol in the Protocol's negotiations history. Heavy reliance was placed on an interpretation "placed on record" by the
Netherlands delegate that Article 33 does not cover mass migrations or attempted mass migrations across frontiers.98This
statement, read during the draft stages of the Convention, was
substituted for plain text as the Court's controlling guide. The
Court was not persuaded that the statement of the Netherlands representative was unreliable because it was not adopted
or agreed to by Convention p a r t i ~ i p a n t s .Nor
~ ~ did the Court
consider the abundant evidence that the mass migration concerns of the Netherlands were never intended to limit the operThe negotiations
ation of the nonrefoulement pro~ision.'~~
history makes clear that the concern about mass migration did
not translate into an agreement that Article 33 would operate
in a limited territorial way.lO' Convention participants agreed
that it would be the antithesis of Article 33, and inhumane, to
return a legitimate refugee to his country of persecution.lo2
Thus, the Netherlands' concern related only to illegal mass
migrations and therefore does not support an insertion of territorial boundaries into Article 33.
In a compelling dissent, Justice Blackmun explained that
the Court botched its interpretation of the INA and the Protocol. He observed that the Court stacked the deck against Haitians by establishing a presumption against extraterritoriality.'03 Hence, although no territorial limitation appears in the
text of the INA or the Protocol, the Court was able to find such
a restriction. To accomplish its desired construction the Court
had to abandon all recognized rules of interpretation. Specifically, the Court refused to accept the ordinary meaning of plain
words when there was no compelling reason to do so.'" Justice Blackmun concluded that the INKS legislative history did
not support the Court's interpretation because in 1980 "Con98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 2565-67.
See id. at 2571-73 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See Schoenholtz, supra note 80, at 79-84.
Id. at 82.
See id. at 82 11.49.
Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2576 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2568-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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gress (1) deleted the words 'within the United States'; (2)
barred the Government from 'return[ing],' as well as 'deport[ing],' alien refugees; and (3) made the prohibition against
return mandatory, thereby eliminating the discretion of the
Attorney General over such decisions."'"
Justice Blackmun regarded the Court's reading of a territorial limitation into the INA as restoring the specific language
Congress excised in 1980 when it removed the phrase "within
the United States."lo6 Justice Blackmun stated that '"[flew
principles of statutory construction are more compelling than
the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to
enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor
of other lang~age.""~~
With respect to the Protocol, Justice
Blackmun emphasized the absence of any territorial restriction
in the treaty language and highlighted the Court's failure to
give it its ordinary meaning.'08 He added that the statement
of one country's delegate cannot override the treaty provisions,
particularly when that statement was not adopted or agreed to
and when the United States had previously taken the opposite
view.'Og Justice Blackmun noted that if there is doubt, the
Court, in a case such as this, should construe congressional
action in a way that would not do violence to international
law.''0

B. The Interpretation Of International Amici
Fleeing Haitians had further support from international
amici. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees ("UNHCR") submitted an amicus brief in Sale opposing the United States policy of repatriation and explaining the
relevant international law.'"
The views of UNHCR are informed by over 40 years of experience supervising the treaty-based system of refugee protection
established by the international community. UNHCR provides
international protection and direct assistance to refugees
105. Id. at 2574.
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987)).
108. Id. at 2568-70.
109. Id. at 2570-72.
110. Id. at 2577.
111. Brief of The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113
Ct. 2549 (1993) (NO.92-344).
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throughout the world and has representatives in over 80
countries. It has twice received the Nobel Peace Prize, in 1954
and 1981, for its work on behalf of refbgees.l12

Through its extensive expertise and experience, UNHCR made
available to the Court historical, evolutionary, contextual, and
textual information to illuminate the meaning of Article 33.
Specifically, UNHCR pointed out that the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees was remedial and humanitarian in character as evidenced by its preamble which declares
an intent "to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of
these fundamental rights and freedom^.""^ One of the fundamental freedoms which Article 33 guarantees is the right of
nonreturn the minute an individual satisfies the definition of
refugee, irrespective of whether asylum is ultimately granted.'l4 This right of nonreturn was endorsed and advocated by
the United States as demonstrated by statements of the United
States delegate to the Convention. The United States delegate,
Mr. Henkin stated,
Whether it was a question of closing the frontier to a refbgee
who asked admittance, or of turning him back after he had
crossed the frontier, or even of expelling him after he had
been admitted to residence in the territory, the problem was
more or less the same.
Whatever the case might be . . . he must not be turned back to
a country where his life or freedom could be threatened. No
consideration of public order should be allowed to overrule
that guarantee, for if the state concerned wished to get rid of
the refirgee at all costs, it could send him to another country
or place him in an internment camp.ll5

The principle of nonreturn was also endorsed by the United
States as a member of the Organization of American States

112. Id. at 2.
113. Id. at 12 (quoting the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.).
114. See id. a t 8 ("Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make
him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee because
of recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee.") (citing UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refuge Status ¶ 28 (1992)).
115. See id. a t 25 (quoting Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related
Problems, Summary Record of the Twentieth Meeting, 11-12, 1 54-55, U.N. Dec.
E/AC.32/SR.20 (1950) (emphasis added)).
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(OAS) General A~sernbl~''~
and by the United States delegate
to UNHCR's Executive Committee.'17
Because of the universal acceptance of the principle of nonrefoulement, UNHCR noted in its brief that the principle was
regarded as a "peremptory norm of international law"'" that
had neither geographical nor territorial limitations.'Ig The
UNHCR Executive Committee, of which the United States is a
member, established many guidelines that recognized Article
33's protection on the high seas.l2' Further, the "basic principle of non-refoulement has been reaffirmed every year by the
Executive Committee of the UNHCR Pr~gramme."'~~
In addition to the powerful historical data, UNHCR presented convincing text-based evidence to support its interpretation of the Convention. It noted that the text of Article 33 is
plain, unequivocal, and broad.'22
It prohibits both the expulsion of a refugee from a contracting
State and, of critical importance here, the return of a rehgee
to a territory where his or her life or freedom would be endangered. . . . [Tlhe term "return" necessarily looks to the
place 'to' which a refugee is returned. The word "expel," by
contrast, refers to the treatment of refugees present in a
State's territory, since, by definition, refugees cannot be expelled fkom a country in which they are not present. . . . [B]y
its plain terms Article 33 announces two broad proscriptions.
The second, known as non-refoulement or non-return, bars "in
any manner whatsoever" the involuntary repatriation of refugees to a place where their lives or freedom would be threatened.123

116.. Id. a t 17. The OAS General Assembly endorsed the Cartagena Declaration
which regarded "the principle of non-refoulement [as] 'imperative in regard to refugees and in the present state of international law should be acknowledged and
observed as rule of jus cogens.'" Id. (quoting Colloquium on the International
Protection of Refugees in Central America, Panama and Mexico (Cartagena de
Indias, Nov. 22, 1984)).
117. Id. a t 18.
118. Id. (citing 1985 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. Doc. El1985162 (1985), a t 919122-23.).
119. Id.
120. Id. a t 20 ("These guidelines recognize that the bedrock protections of
Article 33 extend to international waters, and thus beyond the borders of any
particular State.").
121. Id. n.39.
122. See id. at 5.
123. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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With a dictionary and many Court precedents as support,
UNHCR called for application of the ordinary meaning of the
words of Article 33 while noting that the government's definition of the word refouler would lead to redundancy and absurdity.lZ4
UNHCR offered additional support for the extraterritorial
application of the nonreturn principle by noting that other
articles in the treaty had territorial limitations while Article 33
did not.lZ5This contrast demonstrates that the drafters were
aware of territorial considerations, and intentionally decided
not to place geographic limitations in Article 33. Further,
UNHCR noted that the Immigration and Nationality Act was
amended to conform to Article 33;lZ6that customary international law supported the principle of nonreturn;lZ7and that
the negotiations statements cited by the government were not
accepted by the Convention delegates nor relied on by the government at the time of ratifi~ati0n.l~~
Despite this compelling, readily available guidance, the
Court sided with the government. The Court's action belies the
Court's claim that longstanding domestic and international
practices will not be ignored.lZ9By effectively avoiding the
data provided and contentions made by UNHCR, the Court
continued to signal that such data is only usehl if it coincides
with the executive branch's interpretation.
The Court's interpretive work in Sale highlights the
Court's aloofness toward joint protests by foreign and domestic

124. See id. a t 8, 10-11, 16-21. I n recent years the Court has increasingly
turned to dictionaries and less to legislative history in fulfilling its interpretive
task. See Stewart, supra note 95. The Court has also been more text-focused in
recent years and less willing to consult extratextual sources, particularly when
language is plain. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 621 (1990).
125. See Brief of The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, a t 11, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344).
126. Id. at 15.
127. Id. at 16.
128. Id. at 23-28. Besides noting that the statement by the Netherlands delegate was not "agreed to" or "adopted," id. a t 26 11.47, but rather simply placed on
the record, UNHCR noted that formal changes to Article 33 were followed by the
comments "adopted unanimously" and "[ilt was so agreed." Id. (citing Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record
of the Thirty-Fiffh Meeting, 22,U.N.Doc AKonf.2lSr.35 (1951)).
129. See Trans World Airlines Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 255,
259-60 (1983).
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forces. Obviously unafraid of challenges to its institutional
integrity, the Court easily rejected sound principles of construction and plain text in favor of weaker guides in order to adopt
the interpretations offered by the United States government.
Although fleeing Haitians garnered support from some domestic groups, they also faced growing domestic opposition. This
kept the strength of their protest at the "margin" in terms of
its potential to influence the Court.

When foreign protest rises alone to challenge executive
decisions which come before the Court, amici influence is virtually non-existent. The recent government supported kidnapping
of a Mexican doctor in Mexico serves as a good case study. On
April 2, 1990, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain was kidnapped
in Mexico and brought to the United States to stand trial before an American court for his suspected involvement in the
brutal murder of a federal Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agent. Dr. Machain is a citizen of Mexico and the federal
agent was killed in Mexico.130 It was later determined that
the American government sponsored the abduction.l3'
The United States is a party to an extradition treaty with
Mexico which sets out a procedure for the United States to
request the delivery of a Mexican national suspected of murderThe American government had
ing an American nati0na1.l~~
reason to believe, however, that a formal treaty request for
Machain would not be honored,133and Mexico was not legally
obliged to deliver him under the treaty.134Article 9, section 1
130. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Comment, Kidnapping by Government Order: A
Follow-up, 84 AM. J. INT'LL. 712 (1990).
131. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602-04, 609, 612
(C.D. Cal. 1990) affd 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
Prior to the court's determination, a variety of stories surfaced about the role of
the DEA and Mexican officials in capturing Machain and transferring him to the
United States. The various stories posited official cooperation, a bounty offer by the
DEA, cash payments and protection for Machain captors by the DEA, a swap of
fugitives (Machain for a Mexican fugitive residing in the United States), and misconduct by the Mexican Federal Judicial Police. See Lowenfeld, supra note 130, a t
713-16.
132. See generally Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mexico, 31 U.S.T.
5059 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty]. Of course the procedure would apply equally
if Mexico were the requesting state.
133. Informal attempts by the Drug Enforcement Administration to gain custody of Machain through Mexican officials had apparently failed. See Caro-Quintero,
745 F. Supp. a t 602-04.
134. Article 9 of the treaty gives the requested State the option of turning
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of the treaty provides: "Neither Contracting Party shall be
bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of
that Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so."135
Had Mexico decided not to extradite Machain, the treaty
would have required Mexico to "submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided that
[Mexico had] jurisdiction over the offense."136 Consequently,
Machain could have been brought to justice either in the United States or Mexico under the treaty, making abduction unnecessary. 13'
Mexico had already demonstrated its commitment to bringing the DEA agent's murderers to justice by trying, convicting,
and sentencing several other individuals involved in the murder.138However, the United States executive branch had an
extraordinary interest in ensuring that the American criminal
justice system handle this case.13' Seizing Machain, therefore,
would avoid a refusal by Mexico to extradite and would create
an opportunity to test the legality of government sponsored
kidnapping of foreign national suspects wherever they may be
found in the world.140
In retrospect, the United States' decision was pragmatic
since it yielded the results sought by the American government. Custody of Machain was gained to facilitate his prosecution in the United States, and the Supreme Court ruled that

over the suspect or trying him locally. Extradition Treaty, supra note 132, a t 5065.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. However, as the judge found in Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. a t 612, negotiations between American and Mexican oflicials broke down and Mexico's attempts
to revive those negotiations were rebuffed. Id. The United States a t this point
apparently believed that Mexico did not have the requisite commitment to ensure
that Machain was brought to justice.
138. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 671 n.2 (1992)
(Stevens, Blackmun, O'Connor, J.J., dissenting) ("Mexico has already tried a number of members involved in the conspiracy that resulted in the murder of the DEA
agent. For example, Rafael Caro-Quintero, a co-conspirator of Alvarez-Machain in
this case, has already been imprisoned in Mexico on a 40-year sentence.").
139. Id. at 686. The American government probably wanted to demonstrate to
the American public and to law enforcement officers its fierce commitment to the
war on drugs.
140. The DEA may not have been motivated by a desire to test Supreme
Court doctrine on this issue, but the DEA must have analyzed the abduction's
legal implications.
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the kidnapping did not violate the extradition treaty.l4'
Mexico's immediate protest of the abduction and request for
Machain's return confirmed that Mexico may not have delivered him to American authorities under the treaty. The Supreme Court's holding that the abduction did not violate the
extradition treaty ensured Machain's retention in the United
States and appearance before an American court. However,
justice for Machain was not what his accusers envisioned, because the charges against him were ultimately d i ~ m i s s e d . ' ~ ~
From the outset, Machain's abduction had the makings of a
significant foreign policy blunder. News of the abduction triggered instant and widespread international outcry.'" So, although the United States may have fulfilled national interests,
some damage to its foreign policy and treaty interpretation
image was inevitable. Once the Court accepted the interpretation proffered by the United States government, foreign indignation only increased. Understandably, therefore, concerns still
linger about the decision to abduct and the integrity of the
Supreme Court for upholding the abduction.

A. Interpreting The Text and Intent of the Treaty
The abduction of Machain presented a case of first impression for the Supreme Court. Although the Court had a line of
precedents on the issue of seizures covered by extradition treaties, the specific issue of government sponsored abduction of a

141. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 670.
142. "U.S. District Judge Edward Rafeedie dismissed all charges Dec. 14, after
the evidence had been presented in Alvarez-Machain's trial." Debra C. Moss, Scant
Evidence Frees Abducted Doctor, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 22.
143. See David 0. Stewart, The Price of Vengeance, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, a t 50
("Although Supreme Court rulings rarely attract international attention, the Court's
decision last June . . . triggered a firestorm of diplomatic criticism."); see also Canada Blasts U.S. Court Ruling on Abducting Suspects, on REUTERS(radio broadcast
from Ottowa, Can., June 15, 1992) (The External Affairs Ministry spokesman stated: "Any attempt by foreign officials to abduct someone from Canadian territory is
a criminal act. . . . We will continue to insist that the extradition treaty between
Canada and the United States is the only method of obtaining custody of fugitives
between our two countries."); Latin American Nations Fight U S . Supreme Court
MEXICANNEWSSERVICE,June 18, 1992 (Argentine Foreign MinDecision NOTIMEX
ister denounced the decision as "deplorable" and vowed to formally protest despite
his nation's "good relationship with the United States."); Caribbean: Region Angry
at U S . Supreme Court Ruling, INTER PRESS SERVICE,June 18, 1992 (Foreign Minister of Barbados "called on regional governments to speak as one in objecting to
the Supreme Court ruling.").
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foreign national in his homeland for a crime committed there
had not been previously addressed.
In addressing its primary task of treaty construction, the
Court articulated the well-recognized rule that one must first
look to the words of the convention to ascertain its meaning.'# This text-focused approach is an old rule that has recently increased in significance with many Justices on the
C 0 ~ r t . lHowever,
~~
the Court swiftly moved away from the
treaty's text since it quickly determined that the treaty was
silent on the issue of abductions of the type at bar.'46 Under
the Court's analytical scheme, the treaty's silence was evidence
that the treaty did not limit the jurisdiction of American courts.
Only express and specific treaty language could limit the
Court's jurisdiction.
The Court's focus on the text thus only lasted long enough
to discern what the treaty parties failed to include. Conveniently passed up were the terms which the United States and Mexico intentionally agreed on as governing their conduct in extradition matters. For example, the treaty sets out a comprehensive scheme on how, against whom, and for what offenses and
circumstances extradition is available to the treaty parties.'"
This bilateral agreement also gives each party the discretion to
~ ~ as a
deliver or refuse delivery of a requested p e r ~ 0 n . lRead
whole, the provisions of the treaty offer a ready answer to the
question of whether abductions are permissible. The Court's
abandonment of text in favor of speculative inquiries as to why
the parties did not insert a specific provision on the abduction

144. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. a t 663 ("In construing a treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine its meaning.").
145. The Court's use and reliance on extratextual materials has declined over
the years. See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89Term of the United States Supreme Court,
39 AM. U. L. REV.277 (1990). Justice Scalia, who advocates what is tantamount to
a text-exclusive approach for statutes and treaties has been increasingly influencing
other members of the Court. See United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 373 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("'[Tlreaties are the subject of careful consideration before
they are entered into, and are drawn by persons competent to express their meaning and to choose apt words in which to embody the purposes of the high contracting parties.'" (quoting Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 332 (1912))).
146. In fact, the Court's conclusion that the treaty did not resolve the abduction issue can be found in the sentence immediately following the Court's statement that the Court should look first to the treaty's text to determine the treaty's
meaning. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. a t 663.
147. See generally Extradition Treaty, supra note 132, a t 5061.
148. See id. art. 9, a t 5065.
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issue suggests that the Court was not searching for the intent
of the contracting parties.
A literal and contextual reading of the treaty indicates that
the treaty provides the exclusive mechanism for obtaining foreign nationals. Such a reading would carry out the intent of the
parties and preserve the structural integrity of the treaty. Instead of deferring to the means chosen by the parties to establish their obligations, however, the Court concluded that the
treaty procedure was not the only way one country may gain
custody of another's citizens.'" As support for its extratreaty
options, the Court did not cite treaty language but instead
relied on negotiations history and past practice. The Court
concluded that although the treaty did not authorize the abduction, it did not prohibit it either.'" Unfortunately, citations
and language from the negotiations history were not provided'' and the referenced practice seems to be a single incident
which occurred in 1905 and which, incidentally, did not involve
government-sponsored conduct.ls2
As further support for its interpretation of the extradition
~ ~ 1886 case which
treaty, the Court cited Ker v. I l l i n ~ i s , 'an
~
the Court believed notified Mexico as early as 1 9 0 6 ' ~that
abductions would not defeat the jurisdiction of American courts
notwithstanding the existence of an extradition treaty.'55 In
addition, the Court determined that, had Mexico disagreed
with Ker, it should have known about and secured the inclusion, in the extradition treaty, of a 1935 proposal by American
legal scholars which had specific language prohibiting abductions of the type involved in Ker.'56 Using a "timing" analysis,

149. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US. a t 664.
150. Id. a t 665 n.11.
151. Id. a t 675 n.15 (Stevens, Blackmun, O'Connor, J.J., dissenting) ("The
United States has offered no evidence &om the negotiating record, ratification process, or later communications with Mexico to support the suggestion that a different understanding with Mexico was reached.").
152. Id. a t 665 n.11.
153. Id. a t 660-66; Ker v. Illinois, 119 US. 436 (1886).
154. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US. a t 665 all. Ker had apparently been brought
to the attention of the Mexican government in 1906 through correspondence from
the Secretary of State to Mexican officials informing them that American courts
had jurisdiction to try a Mexican national abducted in Mexico and brought to the
United States. The correspondence also informed the Mexican government that
their relief option was to request the extradition of the abductor, which was done
and extradition granted.
155. Id.
156. See id. a t 666 & n.13. The referenced proposal states:
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the Court concluded that the current version of the extradition
treaty157was informed by these prior events and, in particular, that Mexico's failure to prohibit Ker-type abductions evidenced acquiescence in their legality.
Notice, is of course, not a substitute for text. Even more,
the type of notice informing future conduct should be reasonably specific to and predictive of the harm it seeks to guard
against. Ker warns treaty parties about the potential jurisdiction of American courts over persons privately kidnapped.158
The scholarly proposal referenced by the Court makes an abduction in violation of international law an invalid basis for
gaining jurisdiction over a suspect.159 Neither Ker nor the
proposal address state-sponsored abductions under a treaty.
Thus, even if Ker and the cited scholarly work should be given
some weight, neither can be held to have notified the Mexican
government of the Court's state-sponsored abduction rule.
Nor should the mere existence of Ker and the scholarly
proposal override, without more, a document that expressly
defines the obligations of Mexico and the United States. The
representatives of these nations who negotiated the latest version of the treaty may well have regarded predecessor events
as superseded by the treaty.
Had the Court cited negotiations history showing that the
United States rejected a proposal by Mexico to prohibit
Machain-type abductions, its interpretation would be more
responsive to the deal the parties struck. However, the Court's
citations to distinguishable events as guides to ascertaining the
intent of the parties suggest an outcome-oriented analysis rather than pursuit of principled construction.
A more plausible construction of the treaty was offered by
the dissenting Justices who stuck to the text of the extradition
treaty and to related treaty provisions. The dissenters argued

In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute
or punish any person who has been brought within its territory or a
place subject to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of international law or international convention without first obtaining the
consent of the State or States whose rights have been violated by such
measures.
Id. (citation omitted).
157. The latest version of the treaty was agreed to in 1978 and remains in
effect, thereby governing this case. Id. at 665-66.
158. See Ker, 119 U.S. at 443-44.
159. See supra note 156.
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that treaty mandates cannot be trumped by nonlanguage. In
addition, they found the treaty to be consensual, comprehensive, and exclusive on the question of e ~ t r a d i t i o n . 'Further,
~~
they maintained that the parties must comply with treaty
terms, for if either party were free to use extratreaty procedures or methods, the treaty would become a nullity?' The
dissenters buttressed their interpretation with purposes and
goals analysis.'62 They noted that "cooperation" was the
touchstone of the treaty as evidenced by its preamble and that
unilateral action threatened that goal.'63 Further, they argued that the "scope and objectB of the treaty ought to take
precedence over its silence on a particular issue.'" By focusing their analysis on the expectations of the parties as stated in
the treaty's text, the dissenters established a better vehicle for
ascertaining the parties intent.
The dissenters also noted that the effect of the majority's
construction was a t odds with the language of the treaty. By
saying that the treaty was not the only way American courts
could obtain jurisdiction over Machain, the Court in effect
found that, at its discretion, either party without the other's
Not only would
consent may abduct the other's nati0na1.l~~
such an interpretation render an absurd result under a finely
crafted agreement, it would also evidence a shocking, secret
reservation of right to seize by one party.'66

160. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 675.
161. Id. a t 673-74.
162. Confirming a treaty or statute's text with general textual and related
legislative materials is a sound construction approach commonly used by the Court,
see United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989) (confirming interpretation of treaty with preratification materials); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonzeca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987); California Fed. S&L Ass'n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
163. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 672 n.4.
164. See id. a t 675.
165. Id.
To make the point more starkly, the Court has, in effect written into
Article 9 a new provision, which says: "Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and
2 of this Article, either Contracting Party can, without the consent of the
other, abduct nationals from the territory of one Party to be tried in the
territory of the other."
Id. a t 674 n.11.
166. Id. a t 678-79.
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B. The Role of Precedent in Construing the Treaty
In support of its interpretation the Court cited several of
its precedents. While precedents have their place in treaty
construction, they do not rise to the level of text and should be
weighted accordingly. Further, precedents that are distinguishable on factual or legal grounds are less persuasive than those
on point in either regard. Ker u. Illinois figured prominently in
the Court's analysis. However, Ker is distinguishable from
Machain on numerous grounds. Ker's abduction was not govKer was tried and convicted in an Illiernment ~ponsored.'~~
nois court prior to fleeing to Peru, the country from which he
was abducted and with which the United States had an extradition treaty.168Further, Ker was not a citizen of Peru and
the Peruvian government did not object to his seizure.16' On
these facts the Court held that Ker had no rights under the
extradition treaty since the treaty was not triggered by his
private kidnapping.l7' As a result, Ker could not defeat the
Court's jurisdiction by relying on the treaty.
To confirm the vitality of Ker the Court cited its 1952 decision in Frisbie v. Collins.171 Frisbie involved an interstate
kidnapping of a suspect in Chicago who was taken to Michigan
for trial. The Court upheld the conviction despite the
defendant's claim that the abduction vitiated the trial court's
jurisdi~ti0n.l~~
Reliance on Ker and Frisbie would be appropriate if these cases dealt with facts that bore closer resemblance to the Machain incident. As the descriptions noted herein demonstrate, however, the Ker and Frisbie decisions hardly
prepare treaty parties for a Machain-type scenario. Once convinced of the mistaken premise that Ker was on point, the
Court could not get off track, and its conclusion that Ker controlled became inevitable.
Parallel and more weighty interpretive aides were avail~~
able in precedents such as United States u. R a ~ s c h e r 'and

167. Although Ker's custody was initially sought through an extradition treaty
between the United States and Peru, his abduction by the messenger sent to collect him was not done under official authority. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.at
660.
168. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 437-38 (1886).
169. Id. at 441-42.
170. Id. at 443-44.
171. 342 U.S.519 (1952).
172. Id. at 522.
173. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
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Cook v. United States.174Rauscher arose under an extradition
treaty between the United States and Great Britain, and raised
the issue whether a defendant may be tried for a crime other
than the one for which he was e~tradited.'?~
Interpreting the
treaty as the exclusive mechanism for obtaining jurisdiction
over someone within Britain's territorial boundaries, the Court
held that Rauscher, the defendant, could only be tried for the
extradited offense, murder.176 Coincidentally, the Court in
Rauscher pointed to the specificity of the treaty language, its
procedural mechanism, evidentiary requirements, and purpose
to support its territorial interpretation.ln The treaty's silence
on the jurisdictional authority of the receiving state was not a
hindrance to this construction.178 Unlike the decision in
Machain, the decision in Rauscher stuck to text and did not
treat silence on the contested issue as a broad jurisdictional
grant.
Curiously, the Machain Court decided that the application
of Rauscher would be a great "inferential leap, with only the
most general of international law principles to support it."I7'
The glaring similarities in text and context of the two treaties,
however, command similar construction, even in the absence of
supporting principles of international law. In fact, international
law can only reinforce construction of the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty as condemning abductions that violate a nation's
territorial integrity.
Cook v. United States, another neglected precedent, also
involved a treaty between the United States and Great Britain.lgOThis treaty regulated the importation of alcoholic beverages into the United States during prohibition.lgl In Cook,
174. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
175. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 409 (1886). The treaty limitation
on crimes for which the extradited defendant may be prosecuted is known as the
doctrine of specialty. Id. a t 411. Specialty claims are apparently the most commonly alleged treaty violations. For a discussion of the doctrine and arguments favoring a grant of standing to defendants to make specialty claims, see Kenneth E.
Levitt, Note, International Extradition, the Principle of Specialty, and Effective
Treaty Enforcement, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1017 (1992).
176. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430.
177. See id. a t 423.
178. In fact, Britain remained silent on Raucher's conviction but the Court
nonetheless presumed an objection.
179. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669.
180. Convention for Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, May 22,
1924, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 43 Stat. 1761.
181. See id. art. 11, $8 1-3. The relevant sections provided:
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a British vessel was boarded off the Massachusetts coast and
alcoholic beverages were found in violation of the treaty.lg2A
penalty was assessed, and the vessel and cargo were seized by
the Collector of Customs to secure payment.lg3 It was determined that the boarding and seizure occurred outside the
boundary set by the treaty? As in Machain, the government
argued that Ker contr01led.l~~
The Court rejected this argument, noting that the boarding and seizure were acts of the
government, not of private individuals as in Ker.lg6 Relying
on the treaty language, the Court found a specific territorial
limitation on government conduct and regarded the treaty a s
the exclusive mechanism by which vessels could be boarded
and ~eized."~In giving primacy to the treaty terms, the
Court ruled that the United States was obliged to fulfill the
terms of the treaty by respecting its limitations. In effect, the
Court held that the agreed upon rules for boarding and seizure
had to be complied with before the adjudicatory powers of the

(1) His Britannic Majesty agrees that he will raise no objection to the
boarding of private vessels under the British flag outside the limits of
territorial waters by the authorities of the United States, its territories or
possessions in order that enquiries may be addressed to those on board
and an examination be made of the ship's papers for the purpose of ascertaining whether the vessel or those on board are endeavoring to import
or have imported alcoholic beverages into the United States, its territories
or possessions in violation of the laws there in force. When such enquiries
and examination show a reasonable ground for suspicion, a search of the
vessel may be instituted.
(2) If there is reasonable cause for belief that the vessel has committed or is committing or attempting to commit an offense against the laws
of the United States, its territories or possessions prohibiting the importation of alcoholic beverages, the vessel may be seized and taken into a
port of the United States, its territories or possessions for adjudication in
accordance with such laws.
(3) The rights conferred by this article shall not be exercised a t a
greater distance from the coast of the United States its territories or
possessions than can be traversed in one hour by the vessel suspected of
endeavoring to commit the offense. In cases, however, in which the liquor
is intended to be conveyed to the United States its territories or possessions by a vessel other than the one boarded and searched, it shall be
the speed of such other vessel and not the speed of the vessel boarded,
which shall determine the distance from the coast a t which the right
under this article can be exercised.
182. Cook, 288 U.S. a t 107-08.
183. Id. a t 108.
184. Id. at 107, 110.
185. See id. a t 120-21.
186. Id. a t 121-22.
187. Id. a t 120-22.

11891

FOREIGN AMICI

1225

Court could be legal and binding. The Court confirmed its conclusion with a reference to the treaty's purpose.'88

C. The Weight Assigned International Law
An attempt was made to bootstrap customary international
law to the treaty terms thereby establishing an implied prohibition of abductions. Specifically, Machain argued that the
condemnation of abduction by customary international law, the
United Nations Charter, and the Charter of the Organization of
American States supported an interpretation that would deny
jurisdiction to the courts of the abducting country. Machain's
argument was couched in terms of an "implied" right so widely
recognized that its inclusion in the treaty was unnece~sary.'~~
The Court rejected the implied prohibition interpretation
as a great "inferential leap" that "goes beyond established preThe Court reasoned that, in the past,
cedent and pra~tice."'~~
customary international rules had informed its interpretive
work because those rules specifically addressed the treaty issues in que~tion.'~'However, in this case, the international
principle relied on was only a general proscription that governments should not exercise their police power in each other's
territory and not a specific prohibition against government
sponsored abductions. Instead of using this principle as relevant contextual data, the Court reverted to its general conclusion that, regardless of whether Machain's abduction violated
international law principles, it did not violate the treaty.
By using hypertechnical distinctions between general and
specific international law principles, and by evading the contextual importance of these principles, the Court thus forged its
conclusion that the treaty had not been violated. The Court's
refusal to give international law principles some weight belies
its suggestion that citations to international law that were "on
point" would have changed the Court's interpretive course. In
fact, the Court could have fairly concluded that widespread
international condemnation of abductions is specific enough to
support this principle's incorporation into the extradition trea-

188. Id. at 120.
189. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US. at 666.
190. Id. at 669.
191. Id. at 667-68. As an example, the Court cited its Rauscher decision where
the Court interpreted the Webster-Ashburton treaty as impliedly incorporating the
doctrine of specialty.
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ty. Instead, the Court assigned no value to this important contextual principle.

D. Interpretations Offered by Other Nation States
The United States is party to over one hundred extradition
treaties with other nation-states.lg2 None of these treaties
contains a provision prohibiting Machain-type abductions.lg3
Other countries' interest in the Court's ruling was therefore
high. Both Mexico and Canada filed amicus briefs arguing that
the abduction violated the treaty. Mexico explained that it
interpreted the treaty as "govern[ing] comprehensively the
delivery of all persons for trial in the requesting state 'for an
offense committed outside the territory of the requesting party.'"'" Canada similarly argued that it interpreted and regarded its extradition treaty as "'the exclusive means for a requesting government to obtain . . . [the] removal' of a person
from its territory, unless a Nation otherwise gives its consent."Ig5
This unusual input and guidance from foreign nations
largely went unnoticed, however. In fact, the Court did not
even use the interpretations proffered by Mexico and Canada
as contextual data to determine the contracting nations' intent.
The fact that international response consistently opposed the
abduction on legal grounds should have increased the contextual value of the interpretations offered by Canada and Mexico.
In fact, it should have been conclusive evidence of what other
nations intended when they agreed on similar extradition treaty terms with the United States.

E. Ignoring Foreign Protest l Interpretation
The Court's demurrer to the foreign amici in AlvarezMachain spotlights the Court's aloofness to purely foreign
views and critique. The Court's sense of accountability, and its
concerns about judicial integrity, is at its lowest when essentially "outsiders" are protesting. The reason for this goes beyond the fact that foreigners have another forum in which to
192. See Michael J. Glennon, State-SponsoredAbduction: A Comment on United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INTI L. 746, 748 (1992).
193. Id. at 747.
194. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 675 11.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for United Mexican States as Amicus Curie, at 6).
195. Id. (quoting brief for government of Canada as Amicus Curiae, at 4).
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resolve the general question.lg6 The dispositive reason in
Alvarez-Machain was that Machain did not have and could not
marshal1 domestic popular support for his cause. In a public
sense, his case boiled down to that of a foreigner, criminally
accused of harming an American law enforcement officer.
Viewed in this narrow light, Machain's protest lacked the mass
appeal or the human dimensions that the interdicted Haitian
refugees presented.
In addition, foreign amici were both pitted against an executive slated in advance to win by the Court's rule of deference
and lacked an ally in any of the branches of government. At
the political and popular level, the executive's case was strong
because drugs and drug-related crimes are national problems
and priorities. The President thus had no reason to fear voter
backlash, and in fact may have received political mileage in
backing the abduction. Congress certainly had no stake in
pursuing a matter for which there was no real domestic constituency, and the Supreme Court as public opinion pollster was
quite in tune with public sentiment. From the Court's vantage
point, this was not a truly American issue that would stick in
the minds of the American public.
When foreign amici show up alone, they represent the
weakest check on the Court's institutional accountability. With
such protests, the Court generally need not worry about demonstrations in the street or popular domestic outcry that may
translate into congressional or Executive reaction against the
Court's actions. The Court therefore indulges in complete discretion when selecting forms of construction, interpretation,
and argument to formulate its positions.

Because national interest is a stronger force than international law or principles, the Supreme Court will not likely
change its deferential attitude to the executive when interpreting treaties. Foreign critics have nothing to bargain with when
asking the Court to adopt their interpretations. As the purely
foreign protest experience shows, offering sound construction
and labeling the Court unprincipled do not change the Court's
interpretive course. Securing domestic support improves the

196. In Alvarez-Machain, for example, the Court directed the Mexican amicus
to the executive branch. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669.
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chance of influencing the Court. As the Haitian refugee cases
demonstrate, however, this can be weakened by conflicting
domestic views and politics. Further, the frustrations experienced by purely domestic protestors is a constant reminder that
even "in-house" protestors are not consistent in achieving influence with the Court. And while accusations of dishonesty may
be academically therapeutic, they make no progress in changing the Court's interpretive course. Foreign amici are therefore
doomed to a response of indifference until they devise an internal check of the type available to domestic amici. But as the
statutory interpretation cases show, even internal checks have
their limitations. For example, even if protests of the type used
in Patterson were to result in amendments to a statute, the
Court remains free to interpret those amendments in a way
that limits the intent and desires of popular and congressional
protestors. As such, any mechanism, short of waiting for the
Court to adopt international norms would be beneficial.

